“Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress” with V. Leone Sciabolazza and E. Patacchini
We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is
conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our
results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after
controlling for other well-known predictors of abstention choices and a vast set of fixed effects. We further reveal that a legislator is
more prone to abstain than to take sides when the demands from personal connections conflict with those of the legislator's party.
JEL Codes: D72, D74, D91
Keywords: Abstentions, U.S. Congress, personal relationships, party discipline, conflict